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AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE
OF SUBROGATION: THE EARLY HISTORY OF
THE DOCTRINE I*
M. L. MARASINGHE**
The word subrogation has different meanings in different
legal systems. Therefore, it is of prime importance to state the
context in which the word is used in the course of this writing.
Since this writing is principally concerned with the doctrine of
subrogation in the English common law, the unqualified use of
the word subrogation will refer to its use in an English law
context. The migration of the English common law has resulted
in introducing into American jurisprudence the English notion of
subrogation. To that extent, therefore, the doctrine of subrogation
on both sides of the Atlantic shares common characteristics.'
Any historical survey of the development of this doctrine must,
therefore, necessarily involve an exposition of its antecedents in
the English common law and ultimately, to doctrines of Roman
jurisprudence. Thus, through this developmental process the Amer-
ican notion of subrogation is tied both to the English common
law and to the Roman civil law.
The article has been written in two sections. Part two will
appear in issue two of this volume. Part one explores the possible
bases for the English notion of subrogation. Roman and French
rudimentary concepts of subrogation are examined and rejected
as the sole influence and root of the English notion. Although
the similarities between the English and Roman principles are
apparent, the Roman law required more of a positive act of trans-
ference of rights before subrogation could occur. The possibility
is then posited that the doctrine arose independently of the
Roman law as a purely English theory. It seems to have had its
origins in the courts of equity. The last several sections of Part
one explore the practical and theoretical equitable beginnings.
*I wish to acknowledge the most helpful discussions I had with Professor
Maurice Millner of University College, London, during the formative
stages of this work. Further I am grateful to my colleague Professor
Robert Howe for reading the manuscript and suggesting a number of
pertinent alterations.
**Barrister at Law of the Inner Temple England; Barrister and Solicitor of
the Province of Ontario, Canada, and Professor of Law at the University of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
1. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (Story, J.).
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Commenting on Roman equity, Buckland2 has expressed the
view that subrogation was unknown to the Romans in the context
in which it appears in the English common law today. In Roman
law, the term subrogation was a well-known term of constitu-
tional law, denoting the replacement of one official by another,
or replacing one official's actions with another's action.3 Buck-
land in discussing the concept of subrogation in the area of private
law wrote:
It is not until the time of Justinian that it [subrogation]
certainly appears in private law, and even then it is not in
our sense. In an enactment in the code Justinian says
[C.6.23.28.4], dealing with testators who cannot for cer-
tain reasons get all the witnesses present together, that
those who came later can be 'subrogated,' being formally
notified as to what has been done in their absence.'
But this use of the subrogation concept still did not approach
the meaning of that word in English law. Buckland proceeded to
cite a number of texts5 which display a remarkable factual resem-
blance to instances in which subrogation would apply in English
law. But the point remained clear that in Roman law there is
no subrogation by law. There is no right unless the actions are
actually transferred.6 Buckland further conceded that the
corresponding right in English Law, at least in case of a
surety, amounts to actual Subrogation, and is declared to
be based on natural justice, no attempt being made to
deduce it from any defined principle.7
Therefore, under the English doctrine, no express transference
of rights was necessary. The transference of rights was said to be
ipso jure. The theoretical difference between subrogation and
the process displayed by the texts to which Buckland made refer-
ence8 appeared to be that when subrogation was ipso jure, no
actual transference of rights was required; however, the process
employed in the texts quoted by Buckland required an express
act, an actual transference of rights, which must have taken place
2. W. W. BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAW 47-54 (1911) [hereinafter
cited as BUCKLAND].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 47-8.
5. DIGEST 50.15.5 pr., DIGEST 46.1.36, DIGEST 46.1.17.39, CODE 8.40.11,
DIGEST 27.3.21, DIGEST 46.3.76 and CODE 5.58.2.
6. See BUCKLAND, supra note 2, at 53.
7. Id. at 54.
8. Id.
[Vol. 10
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on or before payment. Failure to do so would result in the ex-
tinction of the obligation, leaving nothing to transfer.
In the course of his lecture, Buckland made several references
to previous attempts to explain this theoretical difference, which
alone makes it difficult to trace the ancestry of the English doc-
trine to Roman sources. Buckland at one point9 referred to Pothier
and to the Code Civile, where the modern doctrine of subrogation,
which is shared by both the English and French legal systems, was
said to operate as an implied assignment. The implication of an
assignment was regarded as producing the ipso jure effect in the
modern doctrine. Buckland further referred to Savigny who held
the view that "wherever transfer of actions could be compelled, the
law would presume it, so that the case would be one of true
subrogation.""0
Although it is not altogether clear to which law Savigny was
referring, Buckland, in his reply, rejecting Savigny, appeared to
treat the latter's observations as representing the classical Roman
law. Buckland discredited Savigny by stating:
But there is no hint of this in the texts, and some of those
above" directly negative the idea. As a general proposi-
tion it is now universally discredited, and the dominant
view seems to be that there was in no case any such im-
plied cession of actions.2
In another portion of the lecture, Buckland referred to Girard.'
He alleged that Girard had traced the ancestry of the "Modern
Theory of Subrogation"' 4 to a fusion of two Roman notions, name-
ly, Beneficium Cedendarum Actionum and Successio in Locum
Creditoris.'5
9. Id. at 49.
10. Id. at 53-4.
11. See note 5 supra.
12. See BUCKLAND, supra note 2, at 54.
13. Id. at 50. The reference is to GIRARD, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE
DROIT ROMAIN § 780.
14. Presumably Girard was referring to the post-revolutionary French
law. It must also be remembered that "subrogation" in the French law was
similar to subrogation in English law, and they together constituted what
was generally known as the "Modern Theory of Subrogation."
15. Although Buckland agrees with Girard's observation, this author
finds it somewhat difficult to accept that Girard was correct. In W. W.
BucKLAND, TEXT BOOK ON ROMAN LAW 479 (2d ed. 1950), Buckland states
19761
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However, the modern French doctrine displayed, at least in a
functional sense, a remarkable resemblance to subrogation. Dur-
ing the process which the French law underwent towards achiev-
ing this resemblance, the French jurists lost no opportunity to
point out that there was a basic difference between the modern
doctrine and its Roman counterpart.'" Having done so, they made
it a major issue to explain away the difference to a point of recon-
ciliation and made it logically probative to draw the inference that
Cessio Actionum was indeed the precursor of the French Doctrine."
Equity's Early Use of Subrogation
English judges, on the other hand, found no such relationship
either to the French law or with the Roman law. Rather, they linked
subrogation to the equitable principle of contribution. ' By the time
of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, the functional aspect of subrogation
had so strengthened itself, that it appeared worthwhile for Hard-
wicke to formulate a theoretical justification for its existence in
equity. This theoretical justification, it will be shown at a later
stage, was the constructive trust." Even at this stage, in 1748, the
judges had not begun to use the term subrogation for the tech-
nique they had newly introduced, in cases deserving contribution,
that in two instances, "Etihe order of priority might be modified by Suc-
cessio in locum, a principle under which the later change could be put in the
position of an earlier one." Both instances are cases which English law
would label "Quasi-Subrogation." In the first of Buckland's examples, the
the later creditor pays the debtor expressly for the purpose of discharging
an earlier debt. See DIGEST 20.3.3 and CODE 8.18. In the second case, the
later creditor pays the debtor expressly for the purpose of discharging
debt. See DIGEST 20.4.19, DIGEST 20.5.5 and DIGEST 20.6.12. In both cases
the later creditor takes the position of the creditor whom he discharges. This
clearly is a case of quasi-subrogation in the English law. Further, Buckland
says of Beneficium Cedendarum Actionum that the surety could, before
payment, require the creditor to transfer to him by way of Procurator in rem
suam, all his rights and securities against the debtor or the sureties. This
dissimilarity of the two principles is clear. Successio in Locum Creditoris
requires no act of cession, and as such is very similar to subrogation,
while Beneficium Cedendarum Actionum involves the act of an express
cessation. Therefore to suggest that the fusion of these two doctrines of dis-
similar characteristics may have resulted in what Girard calls the "Modern
Theory of Subrogation" appears to be illogical. See BUCKLAND, supra note 2,
at 449.
16. POTIER, TRATISE ON OBLIGATION 259 (3d Amer. ed. 1853) [here-
inafter cited as POTHIER].
17. Id. at Part III, ch. 2, Art. 8.
18. Anon., 21 Eng. Rep. 1 (Cary, circa 1557).
19. Randal v. Cockran, 1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748). It is
the intention of this article to develop the theory in a subsequent writing
that subrogation is a particular aspect of a constructive trust.
[Vol. 10
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or in cases involving problems of indemnities such as insurance"0
and suretyships.2 '
By 1782 the common law courts had recognized the doctrine of
subrogation and were using it as if it had always been a part of
the common law of England. In Mason v. Sainsbury,2 Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield was found to say: "Every day, the insurer is put
in the place of the insured. The insurer uses the name of the in-
sured." However, not until the middle of the nineteenth century did
the word subrogation enter the English legal vocabulary. By then
the doctrine had become irrefutably established in the English
legal system. By that time, whether or not it was of Roman origin
was a matter of little importance. The judges in equity were quite
content to believe that equity was the hand that created it. This
belief appears to have been enhanced by the explanation tendered
by Hardwicke in Randal v. Cockran."
In Simpson v. Thompson, " Lord Chancellor Cairnes used the
word subrogation to denote the right of one person who, having
agreed to indemnify another,
will, on making good the indemnity, be entitled to succeed
to all the ways and means by which the person indemnified
might have protected himself against or reimbursed him-
self for the loss.2 5
The celebrated note in this field was not struck until Lord Justice
Brett (as he then was) delivered his judgment in Castellain v.
Preston6 in 1883.
It must not be assumed that there were no leanings towards the
view that subrogation was of Roman origin, at least among some
of the judges in England.2 7 But it was true that no effort was made
by the judges to establish these origins beyond doubt.
20. Id.
21. Fleetwood v. Charnock, 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (Nels. 1629); Morgan v.
Seymour, 1 Chan. Rep. 120, 21 Eng. Rep. 525 (1637).
22. 3 Doug. 61, 64, 99 Eng. Rep. 538, 540 (1782).
23. 1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
24. 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877).
25. Id. at 284.
26. 11 Q.B.D. 380 (C.A. 1883).
27.
The doctrine of Subrogation must be briefly considered. It was
derived by our English Courts from the system of Roman Law. It
varies in some important respects from the doctrine as applied in that
system and indeed for the actual term "subrogation" does not, I
1976]
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Roman Origins for English Subrogation
The Roman doctrine of Cessio Actionum bore the closest resem-
blance to subrogation, as known in England, and it is that doctrine
that had been regarded as the precursor of subrogation. Supposing
A lends money to B, where C stands as surety for B. C is subsequent-
ly called upon to repay the loan to A. C accordingly repays. In
English law, C was automatically subrogated to the rights which A
had against B. This occurred ipso jure, and if necessary even against
the wishes of A. But in Roman law, C could not acquire the rights
of A against B unless they were ceded to him expressly,2 8 at or
before the repayment. 9 Cessio Actionum was a right which the
party paying another's debt or obligation had, which he may or may
not have used, to obtain the benefit of cession.2 The option was his,
and if he failed to make use of it he lost an opportunity to have
transferred to him all rights and securities which A held against B.
It was thus stated in the Digest.'
Fideiussoribus succurri solet, ut stipulator compellatur ei
qui solidun solvere paratus est, vendere ceterorum nomina.
In subrogation, the party making a payment (the insurer) would
acquire an immediate right, without more against the tortfeasor.
This was a result of an automatic transfer to the insurer of the
rights which the assured had against his tortfeasor. In a case where
the insurer, having paid the assured, had brought an action against
the tortfeasor, by virture of the aforementioned rights, Lord Justice
Denning pointed out that:
The Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. are only
nominal plaintiffs. The managing director of the Cold
Storage Co. came to the court and gave evidence. He said
that the Company was not consulted about this action. The
insurers bring it under their right of Subrogation.... ."
Pothier, in his Treatise on Obligation, used the word 'subrogation'
synonymously with the Roman concept of Cessio Actionum. At one
point he asked: "Suppose the debtor had paid without requiring a
think appear in Roman Law in relation to the subjects to which it
has been applied by English Law.
John Edwards & Co. v. Motor Union Insurance Co. Ltd., 2 K.B. 249,252 (1922).
28. Sometimes the court may enforce a cession.
29. CODE 8.40.11.
30. I.e. Beneficium Cedendarum Actionum.
31. DIGEST 46.1.17.
32. Lister v. Romford, [1956] 2 Q.B. 180 (C.A. 1955).
[Vol. 10
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Subrogation?"' His answer was that in such a case there could be
no subrogation because
the pure and simple payment which he had made, having
entirely extinguished the credit and all the rights and
actions resulting from it, that credit cannot afterwards be
ceded which does not any longer exist."
Further in his treatise, Pothier stated:
A surety may exercise the actions of the creditor against
his co-sureties, when he has had the precaution to obtain
a subrogation; but according to the roman laws, he had
not in his own right any action against them, even when
he had paid the debt: this is the decision of the Law."
The theoretical difficulty was indeed this: on payment, the obliga-
tion between the cedent and the debtor was extinguished and
nothing therefore remained to be ceded.
The Romans overcame this difficulty by regarding the payment
as the price for the sale of the cedent's rights to the cessionary.
These rights were the rights which the cedent held against the
debtor, and the payment which the cessionary made represented
the debt.
Justinian quotes Paul in the Digest with approval. 6 Paul com-
mented on the classical Roman law, stating that it was believed
that the payment by a surety extinguished the debt. He added:
Sed non ita est; non enim in solutum accipit, sed quodam
modo nomen debitoris vendidit, et ideo habet actiones,
quia tenetur ad ideam ipsum, ut praestet actiones3
Sande"5 quoting Modestinus with approval wrote:
[A] fter receipt of the money, the creditor's actions . . .
remain intact, and the amount paid is considered as the
39price of the assignment of the actions....
33. See POTHIER, supra note 16, at 53.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 259.
36. See note 37 infra.
37. DIGEST 46.3.76.
38. SANDE, COMMENTARY ON CESSION OF ACTIONS (1906).
39. Id. at 132. Sande wishes to consider the payment as the price for the
assignment, "[r]ather than that the action which has existed has been pur-
chased." This distinction is far too minute to have any effect, at least as
far as this writing is concerned.
1976]
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For this reason the cession of rights must take place "ante solu-
tionem... vel, cum convenisset,"' for thereafter, the rights having
been extinguished, nothing is left for the creditor to sell, "Nemo
dat quod non habet."
Sande," too, supported this proposition. His contention was
as follows:
When several persons are bound equally as principal
debtors in the same obligation, and action as, for instance,
co-debtors, the action cannot be ceded to one against the
other after an interval between the date of payment and
the cession .. 42
He derived his support for this proposition too from Modestinus,
from whom he quoted a further opinion with approval:
If, without any stipulation, after payment of everything
due under and by virture of a tutelage, actions have been
ceded after a certain interval, such cession is of no avail
since no action has survived."
Based upon Modestinus' theory, Sande contended that the payment
made,
ipso jure destroyed and extinguished the whole obligation
in toto, so that no action remains any longer which is
capable of being ceded."'
These observations pertaining to the classical Roman law,
point to the fact that, unless a cession of action took place before
the time of payment, the obligation in toto was destroyed, leaving
nothing to cede. When an agreement was made at the time of
payment, to cede the actions, then the payment was deemed to be
in the form of price for the sale of the rights from the cedent to
the cessionary, and not in discharge of the obligation. This was
believed to keep the obligation alive.
English Subrogation as it Differs from Roman Law
Subrogation, as it appeared in English law, took a very differ-
ent view of the effect of the payment. The payment, be it by a
surety, a co-debtor, the co-obligor or the tortfeasor respectively,
40. DIGEST 46.1.36.
41. See note 38 supra.
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was regarded as a benefit for which one must pay. One of the
effective methods of securing such a repayment was to recognize
a right in the payor to sue the benefitted party. The theoretical
difficulty was that there existed no recognizable legal relationship
such as in contract or in tort between the party that makes the
payment and the party that benefits from it.
Further, there was no legal basis upon which the surety or the
insurer may induce the creditor, or the insured, to sue the debtor
or the tortfeasor on behalf of the party making the payment. Even
if such an action was in fact pursued, there would be no common
law basis for claiming the proceeds from the creditor, or the
insured, after the successful completion of the proceedings. It was
to remedy such a situation that the doctrine of subrogation ap-
peared to have been introduced.
In Simpson v. Thompson," Lord Cairnes stated the rule in
this way:
I know of no foundation for the right of underwriters,
except the well-known principle of Law, that where one
person has agreed to indemnify another, he will on making
good the indemnity, be entitled to succeed to all the ways
and means by which the person indemnified might have
reimbursed himself for the loss. "
The breadth of this doctrine was emphasized by Lord Justice Brett
in Castellain v. Preston:
4 7
This doctrine of Subrogation must be carried to the extent
. .. that as between the underwriter and the assured the
underwriter is entitled to the advantage of every right of
the assured, whether such right consists in contract, ful-
filled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of being
insisted on or already insisted on, or in any other right.5
Such was the doctrine. It must be made clear from the outset
that little or no evidence is available as to the history of this doc-
trine in English law. All that need be mentioned at this stage
is that on payment, and without more, the party making the pay-
ment succeeded to the rights of the party receiving that payment.
Thereafter, that party could exercise all the rights of the party
45. 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877).
46. Id. at 284
47. 11 Q.B.D. 380 (C.A. 1883).
48. Id. at 388.
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who received the payment, to the extent which Lord Justice Brett
had laid down in his judgment quoted above."9
However, if an explanation could be found to show how the
doctrine of subrogation became capable of effecting an ipso jure
succession to another's rights, it may then be possible to suggest
that the Cessio Actionum of Roman jurisprudence could indeed be
its predecessor.
There is, of course, another possibility. Despite the explanation
of how subrogation acquired the ability to transfer rights ipso jure,
without the interposition of an act of cession, and despite the
marked resemblance to Cessio Actionum, subrogation may well have
arisen quite independently of the Roman law as a purely English
doctrine, molded by the tenets of the English law. This possibility
will receive close attention at a later stage of this writing.
The Role of Equity in Establishing an Independent English Doctrine
When one person pays in circumstances in which another ought
to have paid, equity has, since the sixteenth century, displayed an
ability to extract a contribution from the one who ought to have
paid. The significant fact here is that this had been effected by
equity in the absence of any cession of action by the person who
received the payment in favour of the person who made it.
The earliest decision which demonstrated contribution was
an anonymous one of circa 1557, where the Court of Chancery
decided that:
If a man grants a rent-charge out of all his lands, and
afterwards selleth his lands by parcels to divers persons,
and the grantee of the rent will from time to time levy
the whole rent upon one of the purchasers only, he shall be
eased in the chancery by a contribution from the rest of
the purchasers .... 50
Although the report gave neither reasons nor precedents for
the ruling, two issues appeared to emerge from the case. First,
there had not been a cession of rights by the grantee on receiving
the rents from one of the purchasers. Second, the remedy granted
was one in equity.
In 1629, the Court of Chancery, an equity court, had two cases
before it which were relevant to the development of this doctrine.
49. Id.
50. Anon., 21 Eng. Rep. 1 (Cary. circa 1557).
[Vol. 10
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In Fleetwood v. Charnock," "[t] he plaintiff and the defendant were
jointly bound for a third person, who died leaving no estate; the
plaintiff was sued and paid the debt. . . ."" It was decreed that the
defendant would be liable for contribution to the extent of his
proportional part."
In the other case, Peter v. Rich, 4
[t] he plaintiff and the defendant were co-sureties. As a
result of this suretyship the plaintiff was called upon to
pay £105. The plaintiff after paying that sum sought con-
tribution from the defendant. It was held that he was
entitled to receive a moiety, so that the payment that was
made could be shared between the parties.
In neither of these cases did the courts tender any reasons or
precedents in support of their decisions. However, it is noticeable
that in both cases, any attempt to discover a legal relationship
which would have conferred a right on the plaintiffs to claim
contribution from the defendants, would have been fruitless. They
were bound neither in tort nor in contract. The rights which the
contract of suretyship created were rights only in the creditor's
favor. The primary right was the right against the surety under
the contract of suretyship. It was a result of the exercise of this
latter right that the plaintiffs in the aforementioned cases were
called upon to pay. Having paid, Fleetwood and Peter could not, in
their own right, have brought an action against the co-sureties
claiming contribution. The only method available to them for ob-
taining contribution was the acquisition and use of the rights which
the creditors had against the other sureties.
There were possibly two methods by which the sureties may
acquire the rights vested in the creditors. The first was by agree-
ment, in which case the rights were expressly ceded to the surety
who made the payment. The second was by operation of law, where,
upon payment, the surety was given a right of action against the
other co-sureties. The former was similar to the concept of Cessio
Actionum. The latter could be likened to subrogation as it operated
in English law.
It did, however, appear from the two cases discussed above that
the sureties did successfully use the rights of the creditor without
51. 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (Nels. 1629).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 1 Chan. Rep. 34, 21 Eng. Rep. 499 (1629).
1976]
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any express cession of action. The conclusion that the principle in
action here is very close to subrogation is compelling.
In 1673 the Chancery had the case of Morgan v. Seymour55
before them. The plaintiff and Sir Edward Seymour had stood as
sureties for Sir William St. John, who had borrowed £200 from one
Rowland upon a bond. Because Sir William had become insolvent,
Rowland sued the plaintiff for the whole amount. The plaintiff
sought to have Seymour, co-surety, contribute and pay his part of
the said debt and damages.
The court held:
1. That Sir Edward was liable to contribute and pay
one moiety to the said Rowland.
2. That Rowland should assign the bond to the plaintiff
and the defendant (Sir Edward), so as to "help them-
selves against the said St. John for the said debt."56
This case raised a number of issues. First, its name betrayed
the fact that it arose out of a claim by the creditor (Rowland)
against one of the sureties, namely, Morgan. It was as a sequel to
this claim that Morgan was bringing in his co-surety, Sir Edward
Seymour, as a third party defendant. The report is mainly con-
cerned with this aspect oi the action. Therefore it must not be
overlooked that Rowland was indeed a party to the action. Second,
Rowland succeeded in his action, but the court directed him to
collect his debt, proportionately, from both co-sureties, Morgan and
Seymour. Third, the reason why Rowland was asked to collect his
debt from both sureties was because Morgan's right to contribution
had been vindicated.
The significant factor in the Morgan case was that the Chan-
cery was able to discover a right in Morgan to recover a contribu-
tion from his co-surety (Seymour) once his liability to pay the
creditor not only his own share, but also the share of his co-surety,
became, in a sense, crystallized.
In Morgan, Rowland had not expressly assigned his rights to
Morgan. Nor had he been compelled by the court to do so. But the
court, however, found it possible to recognize an assignment in an
ipso jure sense, and in so doing made Seymour liable to contribute.
As pointed out above, the right of a co-surety to claim a contribution
55. 1 Chan. Rep. 120, 21 Eng. Rep. 525 (1637).
56. Id.
[Vol. 10
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was the right originally found to reside in the creditor, and it was
only by a process of transference of these rights from the creditor
to the co-surety that the latter acquired a right to claim a contribu-
tion."' It is as a result of such a transference of rights that Morgan
succeeded in obtaining a moiety from Seymour. And this transfer-
ence had clearly been by the operation of law, i.e. ipso jure.
Four years later the Chancery decided Swain v. Wall. 8 Three
persons were sureties for one H to the extent of £300. If H were
to default, the three persons were to pay their respective portions.
Two of the sureties proved insolvent, and the third paid the £300
upon H's default. The question before the court was what would
the other sureties be expected to pay, in the event of their becoming
solvent.
Mr. Justice Hatton decreed that each of the sureties should
contribute £100 by way of their proportion of the debt, and £7.10.0.
as their portion for the damages payable for the delay of nine
months: a total of £107.10.0.
In the course of this decision the learned judge made the fol-
lowing statement:
[I] f the plaintiff hath recovered or received anything
towards the said £107.10.0., of the counter security before
mentioned, he is to allow the same defendant."'
The plaintiff was the solvent surety who has paid the entire
debt. The decree of the court affected the sureties who are insolvent,
and whose liability to pay a portion could not be enforced until they
have become solvent. Therefore it is submitted that the above state-
ment of Mr. Justice Hatton would only be applicable when the
sureties became solvent, and had paid their respective portions.
Thereafter, according to the dictum, the plaintiff would become
accountable to his co-sureties for what he receives (presumably
from H). For such a receipt of payment by the original debtor
would be deemed as a receipt towards the £107.10.0. paid by each
of the sureties.
The judgment was admittedly devoid of phrases like "standing
in the place of the plaintiff." But the decision appeared to reflect a
particular aspect of subrogation, namely, that after payment the
payor, who may be the insurer or the co-surety, stands in the place
57, See notes 54 and 55 supra and accompanying text.
58. 1 Chan. Rep. 149, 21 Eng. Rep. 537 (1641).
59. Id. at 152, 21 Eng. Rep. at 539.
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of the assured or the creditor, to collect anything that may fall
into their hands which could be regarded as money which belongs
to the transaction in question. The popular basis for this operation
has been attributed to equity. This attribution to equity is made
with such profound learning, and with such conviction that the
judges in the succeeding decades appear to have regarded it as a
waste of judicial time to pause and examine the theoretical basis
upon which equity justified its action in permitting the insurer,
after payment, to stand in the place of the assured or the creditor,
as the case may be.
The next two cases involved the transference of rights created
by a judgment. It will be noticed that the intervention of the court
became necessary to effect the transfer, and it may appear that
this indicates a divergence from the pattern set by equity; namely,
that upon payment, and without more, the transference of the right
of action should take place. However, it is submitted that that is not
the effect of the intervention of the court. In the cases discussed
below, unlike the former cases, the right is a right arising out of a
judgment of a competent court. A judgment creates a right in rem,
and being so, unlike a right in personam, it binds the whole world.
Such a right could only be varied, when it is transferred by the
intervention of the organ which created it, i.e. the court.
The two cases are Hole v. Harrison"° and Parsons and Cole v.
Briddock.' In Hole v. Harrison, one of the sureties having paid
under a recognizance, successfully claimed a moiety by way of
contribution from his co-surety. In the course of the order the judge
observed:
[T] herefore upon Hole's paying a moiety of the said £260
to Harrison, it was now ordered, that he shall assign the
said decree, and the benefit thereof to Hole, with authority
to prosecute Gilpin, to enforce him to pay what Hole had
paid to Harrison with interest and costs; and Hole to in-
demnify Harrison against Gilpin, by prosecuting him in
Harrison's name.62
This dictum pointed particularly towards another aspect which
in later years became one of the most common procedural facets of
subrogation; namely, once a payment was made in discharge of
another's obligation an action could be commenced in the name of
60. Rept. Finch 203, 23 Eng. Rep. 111 (1675).
61. 2 Vern. 608, 23 Eng. Rep. 997 (1708).
62. Rept. Finch at 204, 23 Eng. Rep. at 112 (1675).
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the payee, 3 by taking over his rights against the obligor or debtor.
Such a line of argument could be found in Parsons and Cole v. Brid-
dock. 4 There, the plaintiffs were bound as sureties upon a bail bond
in which the defendant was the principal. The plaintiffs, paid the
sum due under that bond. Thereafter, they brought the present
action to have the judgment obtained under the bail bond assigned
to them.
Lord Chancellor Cooper, allowing the request, said:
The bail stands in the place of the principal, and cannot be
relieved on other terms than on payment of principal,
interests, and costs, and the sureties in the original bond
are not to be contributory; and therefore decreed the j udg-
ment against the bail to be assigned to the plaintiffs, in
order to reimburse what they had paid, with interest and
costs. 5
One observation could be made here, with reference to the
equity in this field. Equity had consistently disregarded the propo-
sition that payment without cession extinguished the obligation,
leaving nothing to cede. For if this was not the position, in both
those cases, the payment, having discharged the obligation, leaves
nothing by way of a right in rem to transfer. It is therefore sub-
mitted that despite the apparent oddity by which the court itself
had to intervene in order to effect the transfer of the rights, Hole
v. Harrison and Parsons and Cole v. Briddock do fall into line
with the pattern set by equity.
The foregoing demonstrated the significant part equity has
played in the field of contribution. Where a person makes a pay-
ment under a legal obligation to do so, the person who benefits
from such a payment would in equity be made to contribute or to
indemnify the person who has made that payment in discharge
of that obligation.
Unlike the effect of Cessio Actionum, equity permits contri-
bution in the complete absence of an express cession of rights.
Despite the practicality of this operation, equity appears to be
uncertain of a theoretical basis for its activity. Equity has failed,
in the above cases, to lay down any theoretical justification for its
63. See Listor v. Romford Ice Co., [19,56] 2 Q.B. 180 (C.A. 1955).
(dictum), in which Lord Justice Denning held that the "payee" could be
the creditor or the assured.
64. 2 Vern. 608, 23 Eng. Rep. 997 (1708).
65. Id.
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operation. And this failure has denied the very foundation of the
doctrine of subrogation. The question remains: What was the
basis upon which equity secured to a co-surety or to an insurer
who pays, the possibility of obtaining contribution (or an indem-
nity) from the other co-obligors (co-sureties or debtor), or from
the assured's tortfeasor respectively, without there being a cession
of action at the time of payment?
Among other matters, the answer to this question may help
considerably in determining the character of the doctrine of subro-
gation. The period of Hardwicke's Chancellorship would appear
particularly significant in answering the foregoing question.
The Period of the Chancellorship of Hardwicke
In 1737, Hardwicke became the Lord High Chancellor of Eng-
land. By that time it was settled that one co-obligor was able in
equity to claim a contribution from other co-obligors, provided that
he had first settled with the creditor. This was so, even though
there was no assignment of the creditor's rights to the payor.
But what Lord Hardwicke was faced with was the task of setting
out a juridical basis for such an operation. The courts of equity
could not look to Roman law, which indeed was a convenient, a
respectable, and a popular source to which the judges at the time
looked for guidance. This was because of the clear theoretical
difference between the present activity of equity and the Cessio
Actionum of the Roman law. At that time the French law, too,
followed the Roman law,6 6 and therefore afforded no help. English
common law, plagued with the idea of privity, provided no room
for anything less than an express cession of rights, and in that
sense provided no new ground for equity to work upon. This left
equity with only one avenue open, and that was equity itself. It
will therefore become evident from what is to follow that Lord
Hardwicke, using equitable raw materials, proceeded to forge a
juridical basis for this activity of equity which, in the succeeding
66. RENUSSoN, TRAITE DE LA SUBROGATION (1760). This treatise con-
tains the pre-revolutionary French law. The principal assertion was that
the French conception of subrogation was derived from Roman origins,
particularly from Cessio Actionum. Therefore, an express cession of rights
was an essential requirement for subrogation in French law. In POTHIER,
TREATISE ON OBLIGATION (3d Amer. ed. 1853), Pothier acknowledged the posi-
tion, but in the name of justice proposed that the requirement of an ex-
press cession be overlooked. It was Pothier's view that ultimately prevailed
in France and has influenced the modern Roman Dutch law of South Africa.
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centuries, came to be known as the doctrine of subrogation. Ex
Parte Crisp" marked the beginning of Lord Hardwicke's work.
In Crisp, one partner of a partnership of three became bank-
rupt. A commission was issued against all three. Two solvent
partners, however, appeared to be both able and willing to dis-
charge the several claims made by the creditors. Lord Hardwicke
made the following order:
Upon the petitioners68 paying within one calendar month
from the date thereof, to all the creditors who have already
proved their debts under the said Commission, the whole
of their respective debts so proved by them under the
Commission, and the costs of the Commission, and of the
proceedings at law, the Commission be thereupon super-
seded; and he also ordered the several creditors of the pe-
titioner, who have proved their debts under the Commis-
mission, to assign the several securities that have been
given to them by any of the partners, for their respective
demands proved under the Commission, to a trustee or
trustees to be appointed by the Commissioners, in trust
to secure to the petitioner, and any other of the partners,
so much money as he or they have respectively paid or
shall pay towards the discharge of such debts, over and
above their respective just proportions thereof; and or-
dered that the assignees under the Commission do re-
assign to the petitioner all his estate and effects which
have been assigned to them, and that they come to an
account before the Commissioners, for the estate and ef-
fects of the petitioner come to their hands, and that they
pay to the petitioner the balance which upon such account
to be taken shall appear to be remaining in their hands.6"
There are a number of important features in this order.
First, the Lord Chancellor ordered the creditors to transfer, by
assigning to trustees,
the several securities that have been given to them by
any of the partners, for their respective demands proved
under the Commission ....
67. 1 Atk. 133, 26 Eng. Rep. 83 (1744).
68. Petitioners in this case were the solvent partners who had petitioned
the court to have the partnership released from a declaration of bankruptcy.
They would pay all partnership creditors in full.
69. 1 Atk. 133, 135-36, 26 Eng. Rep. 83, 88-89 (1744).
70. Id.
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Second, the Lord Chancellor directed the trustees who had
received the assignment of the securities to hold them,
in trust to secure to the petitioner, and any other of the
partners, so much money as he or they have respectively
paid or shall pay towards the discharge of such debts,
over and above their respective just proportions there-
of . ... 7
The cumulative effect of these two passages was to ensure
that there would be an equitable apportionment between the two
partners of the payment made to the creditors by one of them.
This would indeed be the result if a contribution was obtained
from the partner who had not paid the creditor, and paid to the
partner who had paid the entire debt. The order, as it stood,
placed the trustees in a position to effect such an equitable result.
However, such a result could well have been achieved by other
means too. The learned Lord Chancellor could have directed the
creditors to transfer the securities to the partners, against the
discharge of the debts, leaving the problem of contribution to be
resolved by the partners themselves. However, the noteworthy
feature of his judgment was that he demonstrated how the trust
concept could be pressed into service in issues involving problems
of contribution.
In the following year, Lord Hardwicke used the trust con-
cept somewhat obliquely in Sir Daniel O'Carrol's Case."2 There, a
surety, having discharged the debts of Sir Daniel who had become
insolvent, claimed a remedy over against Sir Daniel, the principal.
Lord Hardwicke had agreed to decree,
and likened the case to that of a privileged person, who is
decreed to satisfy . . . and on refusal, instead of an
attachment, a sequestration issues immediately after the
writ of execution, and the estate and effects are detained
in the hands of the officer, till the party has complied
with the decree. 3
The officer who was designated to hold Sir Daniel's property
would in equity be a trustee. The order which followed stated that,
"Defendant . . . shall have remedy against Sir Daniel's estate
and effects, except his wearing apparel. .. .
71. Id.
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The case had the appearance of a proceeding in bankruptcy,
which generally involves a trustee who takes charge of the in-
solvent estate." However, it is difficult to resist the thought that
the introduction of the trust concept in his decree was not alto-
gether necessary for it. But it was possible, as may be seen later,
that by this time Hardwicke's sights were set on another object.
Three years later Lord Hardwicke appeared to have achieved his
goal in Randal v. Cockran.7" The King issued general letters of re-
prisals, to be carried out against the Spaniards, in retaliation
for losses and unlawful seizures they had visited upon British
sea-going vessels. These reprisals were duly carried out and the
vessels so captured were brought before the Prize Commissioners.
The insurance companies, having previously paid the British ship
owners for their losses, claimed the vessels as their own. The
Prize Commissioners refused to accede to their request, decreeing
that the vessels should go to the ship owners. The insurers ap-
pealed from that decision. Lord Hardwicke allowed the insurers'
appeal. Lord Hardwicke,
was of opinion that the plaintiffs had the plainest equity
that could be. The person originally sustaining the loss
was the owner; but after satisfaction made to him, the
insurer.
No doubt, but from that time, as to the goods them-
selves, if restored in specie, or compensation made for
them, the assured stands as a trustee for the insurer, in
proportion for what he paid. . ...'
Until the insurer paid the assured, the owner of the lost vessels,
the assured was the person who sustained the loss. Once he re-
ceived the payment, the assured was no longer the loser because his
loss has been remedied by the insurer. At that point the insurer
became the loser.
In this state of affairs, if the assured were to receive the
goods back in specie, or compensation for them, and if he then were
to be permitted to acquire those for himself, he would reap a wind-
fall from the insurance policy. It was to prevent such a situation
that equity made it possible for the insurer to claim what the
assured had received, subsequent to his being paid, and this
equity did by creating the assured a trustee for the insurer.
75. See WILLIAMS, BANKRUPTCY 250-52 (17th ed. 1958).
76. 1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1749).
77. Id.
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The trust in Randal was one imposed by law, and therefore
a constructive trust. The point that must not be overlooked, is
that the constructive trust operated ipso jure, because it was cre-
ated by the operation of the law. The practical result was that
by making the insurer a beneficiary, he was placed in a position
to make use,
of every right of the assured, whether such right consist
in contract, fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort
capable of being insisted on, or already insisted on, or in
any other right."8
A rationale based on the trust concept was easily the best""
explanation that equity had so far tendered to justify contribution
in a quasi-legal relationship where relationships created by con-
tract or tort were inapplicable.
The justification that one finds stated in the decided cases
appears to be attributed to an ill-defined basis of "justice" or
"equity." It will be seen at a later stage of the present inquiry
that cases subsequent to Randal v. Cockran make no mention of a
basis upon which equity is said to act. They merely repeat the
proposition that the plaintiff should succeed in equity.
Quite apart from the weight that is naturally attached to a
statement by Hardwicke, the trust concept can also be theoreti-
cally justified. First, in English law, the insurer could not stand
in the place of the assured, unless the latter had first been
indemnified. The moment of payment was the moment of indem-
nification. And that moment marked the commencement of the
trust. This is clear from the words of Lord Hardwicke. 0
Once the moment of payment was considered as the com-
mencement of the trust, then it was theoretically justifiable to
regard every right, every security, or any money in the hands
of the assured, as thereafter being held in trust for the insurer.
The insurer, being the Cestui que trust, may therefore enforce the
rights of the assured, even against the will of the latter.
This, of course, is a technique exclusively within the domain
of equity, and it was within those precincts that it became opera-
tive until some time after the Chancellorship of Hardwicke'
78. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 388 (C.A. 1883).
79. See 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMIN-
ISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 493 (1972).
80 See notes 73 and 74 supra.
81. Hardwicke's Chancellorship ended in 1756.
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The first case in the common law courts where the insurer
appears to have claimed the right to sue the assured's tortfeasor
after paying the assured, was decided in 1782,2 before Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield. In that decision Mansfield wrote: "Every day
the insurer is put in the place of the insured. The insurer uses the
name of the insured. 8 3
Since Mason v. Sainsbury, " the right of the insurer to stand
in the place of the assured has been unquestionably accepted and
applied in the common law courts, with the same ease as it has
been in the courts of equity. Further, the doctrine of subrogation
is in no way limited to insurance." Indeed, the importance of this
doctrine is that it applied in a variety of fields where one person
has discharged an obligation of another, in circumstances in which
there exists no legal relationship between the party paying, and
the party benefitting from such a payment.*
82. Mason v. Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 61, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (1782).
83. Id. at 64, 99 Eng.Rep. at 540.
84. Id.
85. McCardie, J., John Edwards & Co. v. Motor Insurance Union, 2 K.B.
249, 252 (1922).
*The second and concluding part of this article will appear in volume 10,
number 2 of Valparaiso University Law Review.
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